Ama za vsako pizdarijo se naredi referendum, da bi pa za resna razmetavanja, kjer se gre za pol milijarde evrov našega denarja kdo kaj organiziral pa noben nič???

Snažilke s sesalci ukradle za 170.000 EUR žetonov. Grozi jim 1-10 let zapora. Ukradel preko provizije miljon Eurov - eno leto pogojno. Uničiti in izropati največjo državno banko - Nagrada. To je Slovenija, dežela srečnih ljudi. ( predvsem lopovov )

to je to....septembra ali oktobra bo objavljen bankrot slovenije...

pa za vse slovence, ki se radi informirate...eno zanimivo predavanje od Zorana Dernovška - finančna slika slovenije...še ne tako staro...

www.youtube.com/watc...nlCW9mav3w

Glavno vprašanje se skriva v zadnjem odstavku članka. Zakaj?

Limassol, June 08, 2011 -- Moody's Investors Service has today downgraded the following banks' deposit and debt ratings, due to the downgrade of these banks' standalone bank financial strength ratings (BFSRs) and ongoing pressures on their financial strength, in particular their capital positions:

- Nova Ljubljanska Banka d.d. (NLB), to Baa3 from A3

- Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor d.d. (NKBM), to Baa3 from Baa1

- Abanka Vipa d.d. (Abanka), to Baa3 from Baa1

Today's rating actions conclude the review for downgrade that Moody's initiated on 27 January 2011.

A full list of affected ratings and associated outlooks is included at the end of this press release.

Moody's has also included the hybrid indicator (hyb) to the ratings of hybrid securities in accordance with our Rating Symbols and Definitions published in May 2011.

The hybrid indicator on each of the ratings of the hybrid securities was inadvertently omitted from the announcement dated 27 January 2011.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's says that the downgrades of the three Slovenian banks are driven by (i) ongoing pressure on their capital positions, given significant asset-quality worsening in H2 2010 and expectations for further deterioration in 2011; and (ii) considerable refinancing needs that could challenge their ability to expand their business over the next 18 months.

ONGOING ASSET-QUALITY DETERIORATION PUTS PRESSURE ON CAPITAL

Moody's says that increasing levels of non-performing loans (NPLs) are undermining the three banks' already slim loss-absorption cushions and notes that their gross NPLs reached 11-17% of gross loans at the end of 2010, up by almost 500 bps during the year. Notwithstanding capital increases by NLB and NKBM, Tier I capitalisation ratios of 7.8% (NLB) and 10% (Abanka; NKBM) remained modest relative to regional peers.

Moody's believes that corporate credit quality in Slovenia remains under significant negative pressure, within the context of high loan concentrations and the severe problems in the real-estate and construction sectors (accounting for 10-15% of the banks' loan exposures). Over the past several months, there have been several defaults of large, highly leveraged holding and construction companies in Slovenia, whilst currently performing companies are also experiencing liquidity pressures.

Moody's says that with provisioning coverage ratios of 50-55% at the end of 2010 -- and the prospect of further asset-quality deterioration -- the banks' capital bases remain vulnerable. Moody's notes that NPLs net of provisions are covered by collateral, but also takes into account the risks related to realising such collateral (typically real estate, plant and machinery and shares in companies) and in particular possible delays that could erode collateral values. NPLs net of provisions accounted for 50-100% of the banks' Tier I capital at the end of 2010.

SIGNIFICANT REFINANCING NEEDS CONSTRAIN THE BANKS' FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY

Moody's notes that the three Slovenian banks exhibit significant dependence on international wholesale funding, notwithstanding increasing recourse to domestic sources. Any setbacks in their efforts to raise this funding during 2011 and 2012 could force them to use their liquid asset reserves or to consider deleveraging.

DEPOSIT RATINGS CONTINUE TO INCORPORATE CONSIDERABLE UPLIFT AS A RESULT OF SYSTEMIC SUPPORT

Moody's adds that the banks' deposit ratings continue to incorporate considerable rating uplift -- four notches for NLB and three notches for NKBM and Abanka -- due to the high likelihood of systemic support. This assumption is based on (i) the banks' importance to the domestic payments system, given their large market shares; (ii) direct and indirect government participation in the banks' capital (majority stakes for NLB and NKBM); (iii) the government's participation in the recent capital increases of NLB and NKBM.

The negative outlook on the banks' deposit ratings is driven by ongoing downside risks to their standalone financial strength (reflected in the negative outlooks on some of the BFSRs). It also takes into account the possibility that systemic support assumptions may be revised downwards over the next few months, as Moody's reassesses the extent to which this should be incorporated in senior debt and deposit ratings in the post-crisis environment.

NLB

Moody's has downgraded NLB's standalone BFSR to E+ (mapping to B1 on the long-term scale) from D+ (Ba1) and downgraded the bank's deposit ratings to Baa3/P-3 from A3/P-2. The outlook on the long-term rating is negative.

The downgrade of the bank's standalone BFSR reflects the continued deterioration in the bank's asset quality during 2010 and the resulting significant loan-loss provisioning, that led to a ?202 million consolidated loss for the year and a reduction in its Tier I capitalisation. Although the bank raised ?250 million in new capital in March 2011 (with 98% of the funds provided by the government, considered as capital support by the European Union), this has only served to push capitalisation back up by 180 bps to a modest 7.8% Tier I ratio.

With net NPLs already nearing 100% of Tier I capital at the end of 2010 and with expectations of further material asset-quality deterioration in 2011, Moody's believes that further significant loan-loss provisioning might be required, which could in turn result in a requirement for additional capital. The E+ standalone BFSR indicates the relative vulnerability of its capital position.

At the Baa3 level, the bank's long-term deposit rating continues to incorporate four notches of systemic support uplift due to Moody's assumptions of a very high likelihood of systemic support. The negative outlook on the deposit rating is based on standalone financial strength considerations and also the possibility that systemic support assumptions may be revised downwards over the next few months, as Moody's reassesses the extent to which this should be incorporated in senior debt and deposit ratings in the post-crisis environment.

The following debt ratings were also downgraded and were assigned negative outlooks.

- Subordinated rating to Ba1 from Baa1

- Junior subordinated rating to B1 (hyb) from Ba1 (hyb)

NKBM

Moody's has downgraded NKBM's standalone BFSR to D- (mapping to Ba3 on the long-term scale) from D (Ba2) and downgraded the bank's deposit ratings to Baa3/P-3 from Baa1/P-2. The outlook on the long-term deposit ratings and BFSR is negative.

NKBM has the second-weakest asset quality amongst rated Slovenian banks (albeit trending more favourably) with a NPL ratio of 14% at end-2010, provision coverage of 50% and net NPLs accounting for about 80% of Tier I capital. Notwithstanding a ?104 million capital issue in April -- which boosted the bank's Tier I capitalisation by 200 basis points to 10% -- the bank's capital buffer remains modest given the potential for asset-quality deterioration during 2011.

The two-notch downgrade of the bank's deposit ratings to Baa3 is partly driven by the downgrade in its standalone BFSR and also by the modest downward reassessment by Moody's of the availability of government support for the bank. At three notches of systemic support rating uplift, the bank's deposit rating still assumes a very high likelihood of such support from the Slovenian government.

The negative outlook on the deposit rating is based on standalone financial strength considerations and also the possibility that systemic support assumptions may be revised downwards over the next few months, as Moody's reassesses the extent to which this should be incorporated in senior debt and deposit ratings in the post-crisis environment.

The following debt ratings were also downgraded and were assigned negative outlooks:

- Junior subordinated rating to Ba3 (hyb) from Ba2 (hyb)

- Backed junior subordinated rating to Ba3 (hyb) from Ba2 (hyb)

The backed junior subordinated rating had not originally included the hybrid indicator in Moody's database in line with changes to Moody's ratings symbols in December 2010 and the rated securities were mislabelled in Moody's database as backed subordinated. They have now been relabeled as backed junior subordinated and carry the hybrid indicator.

ABANKA

Moody's has downgraded Abanka's standalone BFSR to D- (mapping to Ba3 on the long-term scale) from D+ (Ba1) and downgraded the bank's deposit ratings to Baa3/P-3 from Baa1/P-2. The outlook on the ratings is negative.

Abanka exhibited a sharp 500 bp rise in NPLs during H2 2010 to 11.3%, which despite increased loan-loss provisions during the year resulted in provisioning coverage falling to 50% from 81% and net NPLs rising to 50% of Tier I capital from less than 10% in 2009. Given expectations for further asset-quality deterioration during 2011, the bank's already weakened capital position is coming under further pressure (the bank posted a Tier I ratio of 10.4% at the end of 2010).

Amongst rated Slovenian banks, Abanka remains the most dependent on wholesale funding, with a three-year average loans-to-deposits ratio of 140% . The bank's immediate refinancing needs have been alleviated by the rollover of domestic sources of wholesale funds. However, it may have to cut back on growth and use some of its substantial liquid asset reserves if it is unable to access sufficient international funds to meet its considerable refinancing needs in 2012.

The bank's Baa3 long-term deposit rating currently incorporates three notches of systemic support uplift, based on Moody's assumptions of a very high likelihood of systemic support. The negative outlook on the deposit rating is based on (i) standalone financial strength considerations; and (ii) the possibility that systemic support assumptions may be revised downwards over the next few months, as Moody's reassesses the extent to which this should be incorporated in senior debt and deposit ratings in the post-crisis environment.

The following debt ratings were also downgraded and were assigned negative outlooks:

- Backed preferred stock to B2 (hyb) from Ba3 (hyb)

PREVIOUS RATING ACTIONS AND METHODOLOGIES

Please see ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on Moodys.com for the last rating action and the rating history.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were "Bank Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology", published in February 2007 and "Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology" published in March 2007. The principal methodologies used in rating these banks' hybrid securities were "Moody's Guidelines for Rating Bank Hybrid Securities and Subordinated Debt", (November 2009) and "Frequently Asked Questions: Moody's Guidelines for Rating Bank Hybrid Securities and Subordinated Debt" (November 2009).

Headquartered in Ljubljana, Slovenia, NLB reported total consolidated assets of EUR17.89 billion as of end December 2010.

Headquartered in Maribor, Slovenia, NKBM reported total consolidated assets of EUR5.87 billion as of end December 2010.

Headquartered in Ljubljana, Slovenia, Abanka reported total consolidated assets of EUR4.59 billion as of end December 2010.

REGULATORY DISCLOSURES

Information sources used to prepare the credit rating are the following: parties involved in the ratings, public information, and confidential and proprietary Moody's Investors Service information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information available on the issuer or obligation satisfactory for the purposes of maintaining a credit rating.

The rating has been disclosed to the rated entities or its designated agents and issued with no amendment resulting from that disclosure.

Moody's Investors Service may have provided Ancillary or Other Permissible Service(s) to the rated entity or its related third parties within the three years preceding the Credit Rating Action. Please see the ratings disclosure page www.moodys.com/disclosures on our website for further information.

Moody's adopts all necessary measures so that the information it uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and from sources Moody's considers to be reliable including, when appropriate, independent third-party sources. However, Moody's is not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify or validate information received in the rating process.

Please see ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on Moodys.com for the last rating action and the rating history.

The date on which some Credit Ratings were first released goes back to a time before Moody's Investors Service's Credit Ratings were fully digitized and accurate data may not be available. Consequently, Moody's Investors Service provides a date that it believes is the most reliable and accurate based on the information that is available to it. Please see the ratings disclosure page on our website www.moodys.com for further information.

Please see the Credit Policy page on Moodys.com for the methodologies used in determining ratings, further information on the meaning of each rating category and the definition of default and recovery.

Limassol
George Chrysaphinis
Vice President - Senior Analyst
Financial Institutions Group
Moody's Investors Service Cyprus Ltd.
JOURNALISTS: 44 20 7772 5456
SUBSCRIBERS: 44 20 7772 5454

London
Yves Lemay
MD - Banking
Financial Institutions Group
Moody's Investors Service Ltd.
JOURNALISTS: 44 20 7772 5456
SUBSCRIBERS: 44 20 7772 5454

Moody's Investors Service Cyprus Ltd.
Kanika Business Centre
319 28th October Avenue
PO Box 53205
Limassol CY 3301
Cyprus
JOURNALISTS: 44 20 7772 5456
SUBSCRIBERS: 44 20 7772 5454

Če poenostavimo je NLB tista državna institucija, ki ne more in ne sme zbankrotirat. Je tisti nujni koncentrator denarja za financiranje podjetij. Bančnik pač dela z denarjem in po nekem kriteriju da podjetju posojilo, z glavno idejo dobiti ta denar nazaj in zaslužiti z obrestmi. Sedaj si pa zamislimo scenarij ki legalno spelje veliko denarja v privatne roke, pa je vse po predpisih, naklep je pa skoraj nemogoče dokazati.
Visok uslužbenec banke odobri ogromno posojilo recimo gospodu tajkunu. Gospod tajkun obljubi 4% posojila temu uslužbencu na računu ene od spletnih bank. Gospod tajkun ukaže pooblaščencu firme, ki je posojilo dobila, da plača svetovalna dela tuji firmi v ceni 98% posojila. S peostankom torej 2% denarja potem ta pooblaščenec poskrbi za sebe , stečaj podjetja in , da vse izgleda ok. Gospod tajkun poskrbi za izvedbo posla pooblaščenca s predpodpisano izjavo o odstopu tega pooblaščenca. G tajkun sedaj samo še nakaže 4% uslužbencu banke in obdrži 94% denarja na d.o.o v tujini. Vse ostalo potem spremljate po medijih. Vse se uredi, morda zamenjajo uslužbenca banke, NLB dobi nov kapital preko davkov. Gospod tajkun lahko potem preko volitev podpre ljudi, ki bodo nastavili prave nove uslužbence NLB in vse je nared za nov razvojni cikel.
Stvar postane nestabilna , ko je takih primerov preveč. In potem se začnejo dvorne igre na najvišjem možnem nivoji. S pomočjo javnosti, institucij države se izvede pravo vojno titanov. Ko se Gospod tajkun znebi konkurence in ostane sam se igra lahko ponovi.
Vprašanje je kako je Gospod tajkun prišel do tiste prve odobritve kredita, ko še ni imel političnih botrov? Odgovorite si sami, odgovor ni tako težak kot se zdi.

Nevem zakaj se sekiramo zaprimo banko dol pa je.Itak žre samo denar od države sanacija na sanacijo.V Sloveniji ljudje nimajo za položnice morajo plačevati davke naši KVAZI BANKIRJI pa si splačujejo NEZASLUŽENE REGRESE.
mENE SAMO ZANIMA KJE JE SEDAJ g.Bajuk in njegove besede pri nas nebo recesije mal je kriva recesija veliko pa pohlepnost pa spet z veseljem dajemo denar banki.

Kdo pa je odgovoren za srbski Agroživ? VEČER je o tem nekaj pisal. Tudi Finance. Vse tiho je bilo.

Če demokracija pomeni vladavino ljudstva,naj le to zavlada mimo skorumpiranih inštitucij.Banke in podjetja je treba privatizirati,v kolikor ni domačega kapitala se proda tujcu in če ta nima interesa pomeni ,da nismo sposobni imeti lastne države ali se pa gremo še naprej cigumigu do bližnjega konca.

1. korak v normalni državi ni normalnem podjetju
KRIVDNA ODPUSTITEV

2. korak: ugotovitev za koliko škode je odgovoren

3. Rubež in vsedenje na njegov TRR dokler miljonska škoda ni poplačana

4. Eventuelno kazenska ovadba in 20 letna ječa za gospodarski kriminal

Najprvo pa novinarji: dobite spisek ljudi iz državne banke, ki je zagonila ogromno davkoplačevalskega denarja. Do tega smo davkoplačevalci upravičeni, razen če ne živimo v mafijski državi, kjer ne smemo vedeti, kdo je mafijec ( kdo pije) in kdo so njegovi služabniki in hlapci.

Kdor koli je clovek, ki odloca, je treba vedeti, da ne zna ali pa je kupljena oseba! Posojilo se daje po svetu na podlagi kreditne zgodovine (ratinga), kreditne sposobnosti (abillity) in kolaterale. Ne enega ne drugega, ne tretjega te firme nimajo. Na lepe oci ni nic. Tako je to v svetu in tako bo nasa drzava in ta banka zafurala svojo krediabilnost povsod. Tam smo, kjer je Grcija, le v manjsem obsegu, saj nas je manj in manjsi smo. Tak clovek bi moral odstopiti in za dejanje biti obsojen. Na racun tega bo nasa drzava placevala vec obresti in tezje bo dobiti posojilo. Igrati se z milioni, pomeni nekaj drugega, kot s par euri in to bi nasa vlada morala vedeti in se resno zavedati. Oni pa pri Falconu 10 mil naenkrat + 125 tisoc mesecno vrzejo stran, brez da bi kdo kaj komu rekel. Zakaj? Ali ne znamo drugace? Ali smo res hujsi kot butalci? Ne, znanja je dovolj, le vajeti so v rokah ljudi, ki ne znajo. Pa ne mislite, da je Jansa boljsi! Vse so to ljudje, ki jim ni mar za ljudi, samo, da je za njih v redu, za ljudi pa jih ne briga. To je zalostno in resnicno stanje nase domovine Slovenije. Smo pred pragom, ki ga bo treba prestopiti, ali pa se od vsega, cemur se pravi samostojnost posloviti. Biti hlapci nekomu drugemu, to je tradicija, ki smo je bili vedno navajeni. Zakaj zopet v to smer? Verjetno nismo sposobni izbrati ljudi, ki bi dezelo peljali brez osebnega ega in gledali samo zase in za svoje. Kaj nam pomaga dvajset let samostojnosti, ko pa vsak dan vidimo, kaj se dogaja in kako se izgubljamo v turbolenci oceanov sveta, kjer prezivijo le tisti mocni. Povsod so ljudje, kot pri nas, a vodstvo ni toliko pokvarjeno in zaverovano samo vase. Ne moremo tako naprej in oni se kar z novimi idejami kot tisti veterinar, ki je zdravil konja. Konj je poginil, on pa je imel se kar ideje. Tako je z nasim Pahorjem. Glede financ povsod veljajo ista pravila, ce se jih krsi je potem vse drazje in mi smo tam. Ali smo za to krivi delavci z 400- 500 eurov dohodka mesecno? Ce se nekam peljes, voznik mora poznati pot, potniki smo le kot prtljaga, a vozovnico moramo placati, po normalni ceni!!!

[janez101]
Nevem zakaj se sekiramo zaprimo banko dol pa je.Itak žre samo denar od države sanacija na sanacijo.V Sloveniji ljudje nimajo za položnice morajo plačevati davke naši KVAZI BANKIRJI pa si splačujejo NEZASLUŽENE REGRESE.
mENE SAMO ZANIMA KJE JE SEDAJ g.Bajuk in njegove besede pri nas nebo recesije mal je kriva recesija veliko pa pohlepnost pa spet z veseljem dajemo denar banki.

Lepo je, da avtor posta hoče vedeti, kje je g. Bajuk, ker je rekel, da pri nas ne bo recesije. Hkrati pa sam ugotavlja, da je bilo recesije le "mal", kriva pa je "pohlepnost". Menda ne misli pohlepnosti g. Bajuka?

G. Bajuk je imel čisto prav: ni bila recesija tista, ki je do te mere ogrozila naše banke, da bi jih morali zato vsake tri mesece dokapitalizirati (= šenkavati jim denar iz svojih žepov), ampak pohlepnost tistih "naših", ki so mislili, da bodo lahko vse požrli, pa jim trebuh ne bo počil. Pa je le počil!

Ampak važno je samo to, da mi vdano še naprej plačujemo njihovo požrešnost. In da udrihamo po g. Bajuku.

Mafija ostaja na čelu samo kmeti se menjajo, da raja vidi kako zalarjeva pravna država deluje in njegovi spicial sodniki.

Hazabent je takret lepo presedlal iz NKBM v NLB in nikomur nič. Prenehanje delovnega razmerja je tem ljudem božji žegen. Potrebno bi jih bilo zapreti za 25 let, pobrati vso osebno premoženje in premoženje ožjih družinskih članov (če so ga prepisali na njih) in jih nikoli več spustiti blizu poslom z denarjem.

Ja sami pozitivni komentarji. Žal je to premalo. Ukrepati moramo z dejanji, predvsem pa obveščati ljudi.

Večino medijev obvladajo, tako da ljudje ne vedo natančno za kaj se gre.
Ljudje ne verjamejo v velike goljufije-menijo, da so to politične igre in da to NI RES.

Za Zemljariča, Laha, Isajloviča,.., leve tajkune.... ve malo ljudi.

Inteligenci pustijo debatirati dokler se nič ne ukrene. S tem pa se nasprotniki sami odkrijejo.

Ne pozabite, da Kitajci kreditirajo Evropo in so pred dnevi bili pri nas in celo v novicah ob 19 uri.
Tip ki je spregovoril (da to kar se dogaja v Sloveniji ni dobro) me je spominjal na TRIADE. Kitajci vedo z inteligenco.

Če vsak naročnik npr.FINANC redno obvešča 20 ljudi, bo drugače.


Poleg debatiranja, kritiziranja predvsem OBVEŠČAJMO in SPOŠTUJMO poštene DELOVNE LJUDI !

Do upokojitve (menda še letos) v banki ostaja tudi Matjaž Zaviršek, donedavni direktor sektorja za gradbeništvo in predelovalno industrijo. "Njegova" posojila so bila (do 2007) SCT in Merkur, sklepal je denimo tudi posle z Energoplanom , Grepom in drugimi gradbinci. Letos ga je odneslo razkritje, da je solastnik podjetja Arming , ki je z SCT sodelovalo pri številnih projektih, denimo pri predorih Kastelec in Dekani.

In "ODNESLO" ga bo z lepo penzijo. Poleg tega bo užival še v denarju, ki ga je preko svoje firme nakradel v poslih z SCT.

Vsak izgubarski posel še ni kazniv pravi prvi mož
najboljše banke v vesolju pa i šire.Že,že.ampak potem pa naj si izgube familija pokrije sama in ne hodi naokoli prosit vbogajme vsake tri mesece.Torej; visoke plače,regresi,nagrade,avtomobili,bonitete in kar je še lopovskih privilegijev;to je vse zgolj stvar banke.No,izguba je pa nujno stvar države in davkoplačevalcev.Res nas jeb..o direktno v glavo.Vsem,ki so omenjeni v vseh teh lopovskih podvigih
kupovanja firm brez denarja,zgolj zaradi poznanstev in lepih oči je potrebno spisati prijavo zaradi nevestnega dela v službi-za začetek,če armada pravnikov v banki tega ne ve jim rad pomagam.Tožilci pa bi se lahko zganili tudi samoiniciativno,ravno tako tudi policija.Zakaj jih pa vendar plačujemo??

In vse tiho je bilo......Pa saj moramo propast, če se lahko javno vse to dela.

Ja sami pozitivni komentarji. Žal je to premalo. Ukrepati moramo z dejanji, predvsem pa obveščati ljudi.

Večino medijev obvladajo, tako da ljudje ne vedo natančno za kaj se gre.
Ljudje ne verjamejo v velike goljufije-menijo, da so to politične igre in da to NI RES.

Za Zemljariča, Laha, Isajloviča,.., leve tajkune.... ve malo ljudi.

Inteligenci pustijo debatirati dokler se nič ne ukrene. S tem pa se nasprotniki sami odkrijejo.

Ne pozabite, da Kitajci kreditirajo Evropo in so pred dnevi bili pri nas in celo v novicah ob 19 uri.
Tip ki je spregovoril (da to kar se dogaja v Sloveniji ni dobro) me je spominjal na TRIADE. Kitajci vedo z inteligenco.

Če vsak naročnik npr.FINANC redno obvešča 20 ljudi, bo drugače.


Poleg debatiranja, kritiziranja predvsem OBVEŠČAJMO in SPOŠTUJMO poštene DELOVNE LJUDI !

Meni Jašovič ni všeč. Neupoštevanje drugačnih mnenj ni dobra lastnost za managerja. Podcenjevanje sogovornika prav tako.

[sreckos]
> [janez101]
> Nevem zakaj se sekiramo zaprimo banko dol pa je.Itak žre samo denar od države sanacija na sanacijo.V Sloveniji ljudje nimajo za položnice morajo plačevati davke naši KVAZI BANKIRJI pa si splačujejo NEZASLUŽENE REGRESE.
> mENE SAMO ZANIMA KJE JE SEDAJ g.Bajuk in njegove besede pri nas nebo recesije mal je kriva recesija veliko pa pohlepnost pa spet z veseljem dajemo denar banki.

Lepo je, da avtor posta hoče vedeti, kje je g. Bajuk, ker je rekel, da pri nas ne bo recesije. Hkrati pa sam ugotavlja, da je bilo recesije le "mal", kriva pa je "pohlepnost". Menda ne misli pohlepnosti g. Bajuka?

G. Bajuk je imel čisto prav: ni bila recesija tista, ki je do te mere ogrozila naše banke, da bi jih morali zato vsake tri mesece dokapitalizirati (= šenkavati jim denar iz svojih žepov), ampak pohlepnost tistih "naših", ki so mislili, da bodo lahko vse požrli, pa jim trebuh ne bo počil. Pa je le počil!

Ampak važno je samo to, da mi vdano še naprej plačujemo njihovo požrešnost. In da udrihamo po g. Bajuku.

Ampak največ tajkunskih kreditov sta NLB in NKBM dali prav pod Bajukovim ministrovanjem. Ali ne?

[bsuhel]
Če poenostavimo je NLB tista državna institucija, ki ne more in ne sme zbankrotirat. Je tisti nujni koncentrator denarja za financiranje podjetij. Bančnik pač dela z denarjem in po nekem kriteriju da podjetju posojilo, z glavno idejo dobiti ta denar nazaj in zaslužiti z obrestmi. Sedaj si pa zamislimo scenarij ki legalno spelje veliko denarja v privatne roke, pa je vse po predpisih, naklep je pa skoraj nemogoče dokazati.
Visok uslužbenec banke odobri ogromno posojilo recimo gospodu tajkunu. Gospod tajkun obljubi 4% posojila temu uslužbencu na računu ene od spletnih bank. Gospod tajkun ukaže pooblaščencu firme, ki je posojilo dobila, da plača svetovalna dela tuji firmi v ceni 98% posojila. S peostankom torej 2% denarja potem ta pooblaščenec poskrbi za sebe , stečaj podjetja in , da vse izgleda ok. Gospod tajkun poskrbi za izvedbo posla pooblaščenca s predpodpisano izjavo o odstopu tega pooblaščenca. G tajkun sedaj samo še nakaže 4% uslužbencu banke in obdrži 94% denarja na d.o.o v tujini. Vse ostalo potem spremljate po medijih. Vse se uredi, morda zamenjajo uslužbenca banke, NLB dobi nov kapital preko davkov. Gospod tajkun lahko potem preko volitev podpre ljudi, ki bodo nastavili prave nove uslužbence NLB in vse je nared za nov razvojni cikel.
Stvar postane nestabilna , ko je takih primerov preveč. In potem se začnejo dvorne igre na najvišjem možnem nivoji. S pomočjo javnosti, institucij države se izvede pravo vojno titanov. Ko se Gospod tajkun znebi konkurence in ostane sam se igra lahko ponovi.
Vprašanje je kako je Gospod tajkun prišel do tiste prve odobritve kredita, ko še ni imel političnih botrov? Odgovorite si sami, odgovor ni tako težak kot se zdi.

Očitno si insider ;). Točno to se namreč dogaja! To ni noben hipotetični primer.

zakaj je sploh potrebna dokapitalizacija ?

Ko tole prebereš te prime, da bi isti trnutek spokal kufre in izginil za vekomaj iz te zaudarjajoče slovenske mlakuže. Res ogabno! Banda, ki se je na naš račun kotila in zapravljala milijarde (in to še vedno počne)za svoje prjatlčke, ki so jim seveda pricurnili obvezni porcjonček, se svobodno šeta po ljubi zemljici in se nam gromko smeje. Kot v tistih filmih: eksotična plaža, fini ligeštul, Ray Ban, koktajlčki all day long, life is beautiful!Zakonodaja: ja ta je bila pa prštimana tako, da se gospodom niti slučajno ne more nič zgoditi.

Kje je zdaj nacionalni interes Kucanovega klana?
Pred leti so rohneli da morajo velika slovenska podjetja in banke ostati v domacih rokah. Zdaj lahko butast narod vidi zakaj.Tovarisi Gospodje so izcuzali precejsnje vsote v svoj zep, potem "dokapitalizacija", sanacija ,nato ponovno cuzanje.
Cas je da Zidar,Kramar in ostali patroni privlecejo nagrabljeno iz svojih jazbin in tajnih racunov v davcnih oazah!

Za bruhat, res. Drugač pa NLB bo... bankrotirala! Wait and see... Sistemska banka, ki jo bo država vedno in večno reševala?! Kaj še! Sploh pa, nismo davkoplačevalci tega finančno sposobni. Bankrot, ali napis KBC na stolpnici! (ter uklanjanje imena NLB v roku dveh let. Ni druge.)

to je sramota brez primere. isti ljudje si samo stolčke menjajo. vsi ministri so navadne p... brez j...

[menedzerjilopovi]
Kje je zdaj nacionalni interes Kucanovega klana?

To ni nikakeršna skrivnost, po uradnih podatkih Banke Slovenije je samo v letu 2010 v več sto transakcijah samo na Ciper in v Lihtenštajn odteklo mislim da okoli 400 mio €.

Glupim ovcam, ki so kupile, zagovarjale in prodajale štorijo o nacionalnem interesu pa zdaj ne ostane drugega, kot da poleg tega da so jih oropali plačujejo zapitke - NLB 250 mio + 250 mio, Adria ? itd.

Banksters!

Prav zaradi požrešnežev in skrbnikov za lasten žep (napakar, kučanisti, ...) smo ob vso kredibilnost v Evropi. kaj dela Evropa? Oslabila bo NLB in jo bo KBC nato "uspešno" prevzela in "kupila". Vse tiče, ki so uničili Slovenijo, morajo čakati odprta vrata na Dobu. Kako? S "Sodbo v imenu LJUDSTVA"! Bojte se, napakarji in kučanisti, pravne države, kar Slovenija enkrat bo. Enkrat kmalu!!