[republican]
Se strinjam s tabo. Južnoevropske države enostavno ne morejo konkurirati nemški produktivnosti. Včasih so to reševale z devalvacijami svojih valut, zdaj imajo pa z Evrom zvezane roke. Kaj je po tvoje rešitev? Južni Evro?

Tezko. Tudi med slovenijo in grcijo so razlike... kakrsnakoli valutna unija, ki je podobna evru, ne more preziveti pod temi pogoji. Ce so razlike manjse, samo vec casa traja, da se nabere kriticna kolicina napetosti.

Jasno je seveda, da so mozne resitve tri: nemcija dopusti rast svojih plac (japajade :), uvede se fiskalna unija (te prakticno nihce noce, ne jug ne sever), ali pa postopni izstopi clanic iz evrocone, podobno kot je (raz)padel zlati standard.

Preden je bil uveden evro, so ekonomisti svarili na podlagi zgodovine ERM1, ki jo sedaj razni vodopivci pozabljajo: kako so celo razvite drzave pod mocjo ekonomskih dejavnikov po vrsti pokleknile in izstopile iz fiksnih tecajev:

en.wikipedia.org/wik..._Wednesday

In to je bilo PO tistem, ko je Thatcherjeva spravila UK v red. Tole vodopivcu in vsem ostalim v branje:


When the ERM was set up in 1979, the United Kingdom declined to join. This was a controversial decision, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe, was staunchly pro-European. His successor Nigel Lawson, a believer in a fixed exchange rate, admired the low inflationary record of West Germany. He attributed it to the strength of the Deutsche Mark and the management of the Bundesbank.

Thus, although the UK had not joined the ERM, from early 1987 to March 1988 the Treasury followed a semi-official policy of 'shadowing' the Deutsche Mark.[4] Matters came to a head in a clash between Lawson and Margaret Thatcher's economic adviser Alan Walters, when Walters claimed that the Exchange Rate Mechanism was "half baked". This led to Lawson resigning as chancellor to be replaced by his old protégé John Major, who, with Douglas Hurd, the then Foreign Secretary, convinced the Cabinet to sign Britain up to the ERM in October 1990, effectively guaranteeing that the British Government would follow an economic[5] and monetary policy that would prevent the exchange rate between the pound and other member currencies from fluctuating by more than 6%.


Na kaj nas ze to spominja?

Other ERM countries such as Italy, whose currencies had breached their bands during the day, returned to the system with broadened bands or with adjusted central parities. Even in this relaxed form, ERM-I proved vulnerable, and ten months later the rules were relaxed further to the point of imposing very little constraint on the domestic monetary policies of member states.

The effect of the high German interest rates, and high British interest rates, had arguably put Britain into recession as large numbers of businesses failed and the housing market crashed. Some commentators, following Norman Tebbit, took to referring to ERM as an "Eternal Recession Mechanism"


Zgodovina, zgodovina iz katere se nekateri nic ne naucijo.